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The notion that allowing third party access to the natural monopoly, below-rail track 
and signalling infrastructure might induce competitive entry in above-rail train 
operations has been a part of European and Australian rail policy since the early 
1990s.  However, competition has been slow to emerge and it is useful to ask why.  
This paper examines railways from a number of different perspectives in an attempt to 
understand the limits of what policymakers might expect from a rail access regime. 
Introduction 
Third party access to railway infrastructure was first introduced more than a decade 
ago in Australia and Europe.  Contrary to the expectations of many policymakers, 
there has been relatively little entry into the market for above-rail train operations.  
This paper asks why, and endeavours to answer the question by considering railways 
from a number of different perspectives.  The resulting analysis, it is hoped, will be 
useful for policymakers seeking to chart the sustainable future of Australia’s railways. 
 
Section Two of this paper presents the two extreme arguments; that railway track is a 
marketplace and that it is a conveyor belt, integral to above-rail operations.  Section 
Three examines the historical record of the provision of access.  Section Four 
examines railways as economic entities from a number of different perspectives, 
endeavouring to ascertain the extent to which we might expect access and structural 
reform to be successful.  Section Five provides some policy conclusions. 
The Perspectives 
The arguments surrounding the nature of the above-rail sector in respect to access 
seem to have divided into two opposing camps; that railway track can be made into a 
marketplace and that a railway track is integrally tied to above-rail operations.  This is 
seen most clearly in the recent National Competition Council (NCC, 2005) 
deliberations in regards to the iron ore railways in the Pilbara.  As this paper will 
endeavour to show, whilst both arguments might apply to some railways, neither has 
general application in the industry.  In this section, I summarise the arguments. 
Above-Rail Operations are a Marketplace 
The notion that railways are a marketplace stems from the notion that the below-rail 
infrastructure is a natural monopoly; that its sunk costs mean there is room for only 
one provider.  If this is so, competition might best be introduced to the industry 
through the above-rail sector.2  In turn, this requires the railway track to become a 
marketplace.  A marketplace has two fundamental characteristics: 
                                                 
1 n.wills-johnson@curtin.edu.au View my research on my SSRN Author page: 
http://ssrn.com/author=106139  
2 This is not the only way in which competition might be introduced.  Biggar (2004) suggests a number 
of different options for introducing competition. 
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• There is something to sell, and there are multiple sellers and buyers of the service. 
• Rules can be devised to effect sale which are acceptable to all parties and match 
the nature of the good being sold. 
 
Railways sell transport services and require train paths in order to do so.  An access 
regime is the means by which above-rail operators obtain train paths from below rail 
operators.  These train paths are the ‘stalls’ in which the railways sell their services.  
In order for there to be a market, different railways need to own (or lease) different 
‘stalls’; otherwise one has a shop, not a market.   
 
In a general sense, the rules by which a market operates must reflect the underlying 
characteristics of the good or service being traded.  For example, an electricity market 
which ignored Kirchoff’s Law would be useless.  In a railway, the underlying ‘laws’ 
are the train management protocols.  Unlike Kirchoff’s Law, these might vary from 
railway to railway.  This adds to flexibility, but also means that they are partially 
subjective, potentially making trust difficult to engender.   
 
Train management protocols mean that a railway operator must surrender control of 
its trains to the train manager as soon as they enter the network.  The train manager is 
not influenced by economic factors such as price, but rather operates according to 
practices developed which ensure safe and efficient movement across the network.  
These rules need to incorporate unforseen events, such as accidents, or trains moving 
too slow or too fast.  They also need to ensure that delays are not spread through the 
network, and must hence be rather authoritarian.  They are more like traffic signals 
and signs in road networks than a Walrasian auctioneer in the standard economic 
model.  In principle, it is possible to design penalty and charging regimes to ensure 
that market incentives are aligned with the underlying rules of the train management 
regime, and that the system is not ‘gamed’.  However, in practice, this is difficult.  In 
the UK, the system of apportioning penalty payments according to an assessment of 
whether the relevant fault was above or below the rail interface, resulted in a total 
penalty payment of between £150 and £200 million in the three years to 2002/03 
during which it operated.  Some 300 people were employed by the rail companies to 
work on apportioning blame.  A recent UK government White Paper (UKDFT, 2004) 
suggested that, whilst the franchising had improved understanding and transparency 
of rail costs, these costs had increased due to “complex commercial and bureaucratic 
relationships, the lack of clarity for responsibilities and the misaligned incentives 
between each part of the industry” (Ibid, p21).   
 
Clearly there are difficulties associated with forming an effective marketplace on a 
railway track.  This does not mean that creating a new market is impossible.  
However, where the network is complex (or congested), or where the train paths 
themselves are more complicated (for example, cycles, rather than set scheduled 
services), forming a market may be more difficult.  Thus, rather than presuming that a 
market will be able to form, regardless of the particulars of a given railway, 
policymakers should pay particular attention to how such a market might form. 
Above-Rail Operations as a Conveyor Belt 
The opposing argument holds that above and below-rail operations are tightly 
integrated, and place a barrier between them (by either vertical separation or third 
party access) will lead to marked reductions in efficiency.  An extreme form of this 
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argument was used by Hamersley Iron when Robe River Associates sought access to 
its track in the Pilbara in September 1998.  Hamersley Iron argued that their railway 
track formed an integral part of their iron ore logistics chain, from mine to port, and 
hence that access should not be granted on the basis that the railway was part of its 
production process.  This gave rise to the ‘conveyor belt’ description of a railway 
used in the title of this paper.  In June 1999, the Federal Court handed down its final 
decision, accepting this production process argument.3  In a different context, Ivaldi & 
McCullough (2006) have suggested that vertical separation in US railways would lead 
to efficiency losses of between 20 and 40 percent. 
 
The argument for railways as a conveyor belt pre-empts the discussion of transactions 
cost economic below, and suggests that it is more efficient to provide rail track 
services in-house than via a third-party track owner.  It is not too difficult to 
understand the underlying reason for this suggestion.  The critical interface in a 
railway is between the wheel of a train and the rail track.  Optimising this interface is 
the main goal of railway engineers.  If the interface is managed by contract, it seems 
likely that this will cause more problems than if it is managed within a single 
company simply because writing complete contracts in complex situations is difficult.  
In addition, separating a railway at the point of intersection between wheel and rail 
also gives rise to potentially poor incentives; fixing a poorly ground wheel might 
bring few benefits for a railway operator without track and with a small freight task, 
but not fixing it could have major impacts on all other users of the track.  Designing 
systems which overcome these incentive mismatches may prove difficult.  
 
However, the mere fact that railways might be able to better manage the interface 
between wheel and rail in-house does not necessarily mean that a given railway will 
do so.  In an examination of Australian public railways (Wills-Johnson, 2007a) found 
that vertical separation in the mid 1990s was likely to have caused few efficiency 
losses, due in part to the fact that the vertically integrated railways had not been 
particularly adept at managing the wheel-rail interface in-house.  Indeed, some 
industry stakeholders have suggested that putting the interface into contracts threw 
many of the problems associated with its management into sharp relief, forcing the 
above and below rail parties to deal with them in a transparent manner.  In some 
instances, therefore, it may be simpler for policymakers to require open access or to 
vertically separate a railway than to attempt reform from inside the railway. 
 
The key phrase above is ‘in some instances’.  Just as it is not possible to generalise 
and suggest all railways will make good marketplaces, it is also not possible to 
generalise and say that all railways are suited or unsuited for vertical separation; there 
are many paths to cost minimisation.  The focus for policymakers should be on how a 
given railway has integrated its above and below-rail operations, and the impacts 
either third party access or separation might have on the railway in question.  In some 
instances, the railway will indeed be a ‘conveyor belt’, whilst in others it will not. 
The Emergence of Above-Rail Competition 
Australia and Europe have now more than a decade of experience with third party 
access regimes.  The historical record thus far, however, is not particularly bright. In 
Australia, immediately following the introduction of open access in the mid Nineties, 
                                                 
3 More recently, in the case of BHP, this finding has not been upheld. 
 4
SCT, Toll and Patrick Rail entered the above rail industry, with Toll and SCT taking 
up to a quarter of the market on the East West freight rail link. Toll and Patrick Rail 
subsequently formed Pacific National, and SCT now has a market share on the East 
West link of less than five percent. Other new entrants include:  
• South Spur Rail, in WA, which has a small fleet of locomotives and undertakes 
hook and pull services for other rail companies.  In 2006, it merged with Silverton 
Tramways to form Southern-Silverton.  In 2007, the merged group became part of 
Coote Industrial Rail.  
• CRT, in Victoria and NSW which owned wagons, some terminals and brought 
Sprinter trains into Australia. CRT has subsequently been taken over by QR  
• Lachlan Valley, which owns wagons and moves container freight in NSW.  
• Chicago Freight Car Leasing, which leases wagons and locomotives in Australia, 
filling a key role for new market entrants.  
 
The market share of these new entrants is negligible. Most of the competition in 
Australia has come from the rail companies formed during the reform process or 
given concessions as part of it. These companies are beginning to compete in each 
other’s markets. For example:  
•  Pacific National (PN) has secured freight haulage contracts in north Queensland.  
• QR has secured coal haulage contracts in NSW and has recently purchased CRT 
in Victoria (with its associated terminal) and the above-rail interests of the 
Australian Railroad Group (ARG) in WA. It also plans to turn its Acacia Ridge 
terminal into an open access terminal.  
• Freightlink, the operator of the Tarcoola-Darwin Railway has begun offering 
services between Adelaide and Melbourne.  
• Genessee & Wyoming Australia, once part-owner of ARG and now the owner and 
operator of the intrastate network in SA has begun offering contract services, 
locomotives, wagons and crew to freight forwarders on the interstate network. 
 
There is also evidence of industry consolidation: 
• QR has taken over CRT and has purchased the above-rail operations of ARG in 
WA in a joint venture with Babcock and Brown Infrastructure, who now own the 
lease on the below-rail assets.4 
• PN has taken over the freight concessions of Freight Australia in Victoria and 
ATN in Tasmania (with the State Governments taking over the track 
infrastructure).  Subsequently, one of the owners of PN (Toll) has taken over the 
other owner (Patrick) and the rail business PN has been combined with Patrick’s 
port operations and vested in a new company, Asciano Limited. 
 
Since the consolidated railways are still smaller than their US Class One counterparts, 
the consolidation seen to date may not be the end of the process, absent of ACCC 
intervention in the merger process.   
 
Whilst consolidation may mean greater power for railways in the short-term, contract 
renegotiation provides at least larger customers with countervailing power.  Major 
freight customers, place their haulage contracts out to open tender and, even when 
incumbents win, the pressure of competitive bidding can force down prices.  This, 
                                                 
4 This is a rare example of the market choosing vertical separation, rather than it being imposed by 
policymakers. 
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however, may be a short-term phenomenon, as firms fight for market share, rather 
than a characteristic of long-term market equilibrium. 
 
In Europe, the history is slightly longer; Sweden first introduced rail access in 1988, 
and EC Directive 91/440 required both accounting separation of above and below rail 
entities and the provision of access for international, inter-modal railway operators, as 
part of the European Union’s advocacy of cross-border trade integration from 1991.  
This has been extended in the First and Second Railway Packages (2001 and 2002 
respectively) to address the many inter-operability issues amongst European railways 
that had made cross-border traffic difficult, and to extend the right of access to 
domestic as well as international freight operators.  Europe also has a larger freight 
task than Australia, although many country markets are smaller, and routes are 
generally shorter.  However, in Europe too, however, progress has been disappointing, 
apart from incumbents in each country obtaining access to neighbouring markets on a 
reciprocal basis.  Table One summarises new market entry in Europe. 
 
Table 1 New Entrants in European Rail Markets (2004) 
Country Number of New Entrants Share of market 
Austria 10 negligible 
Belgium 4 (only one operating on Belgian network) Not provided, but market regarded as 
effectively closed. 
Czech Republic 7 (two of which are the transport arm of coal mines) Two percent of freight market in tkm. 
Denmark 6 (plus small network concessions for regional passenger 
networks) 
Less than five percent, for both freight and 
passenger transport. 
Estonia 4 (two passenger and two freight) n/a 
Finland None (state railway has legal monopoly) zero 
France None Zero 
Germany 160 Approximately 10 percent in freight and 
passenger. 
Great Britain 28 passenger (25 from concessions, 3 new) and four freight 100 percent (incumbent dissolved in rail 
reforms) 
Greece None (two small operators scheduled to start in 2004 for 
local services) 
Zero 
Hungary None (two incumbents share a duopoly) Zero 
Ireland None Zero 
Italy 33 (12 active on incumbent’s network, remainder active 
before reform on regional networks) 
Two percent in freight and less than one 
percent in passenger markets 
Latvia Two new entrants in freight, none in passenger rail 2-3 percent of freight market. 
Lithuania Four entrants hold licences but none are active Zero 
Luxembourg none Zero 
Netherlands 15 (six in freight) n/a 
Norway None Zero 
Poland 21 in freight, zero in passenger Three percent in freight. 
Portugal None Zero 
Slovakia 18 (only three active) n/a 
Slovenia None (but 90 percent of the passenger and freight market is 
international thru-traffic) 
Zero 
Spain Two state owned companies share the market as a duopoly.   Zero 
Sweden 16 (ten active in freight, seven in passenger rail) Almost half of the freight market and a third 
of the passenger market (including regional 
franchises) in 2002. 
Switzerland 10, but only one (BLS Cargo) is a result of liberalisation. BLS Cargo  has a 12 percent share of the 
freight market.  The passenger market is 
still closed. 
Source: IBM Consulting Services, 2004.  Note that figures for new entrants do not include reciprocal cabotage rights between 
incumbents in different countries, but rather to the number of new entrants which are domiciled  in each country as a rail 
transport provider.  These may have as their parent companies, incumbent operators from other countries. 
 
In part, this failure reflects institutional inertia.  Many domestic railway companies 
have been hostile to third party access and structural reform, and this has lead to less 
than fully-fledged enthusiasm on the part of governments driving the reform process.  
In some cases, this has meant delayed introduction, whilst in others, it has meant 
structures which reflect the letter, rather than the spirit of the EC directives.  De Rus 
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(2006) suggests that unbundling in France and Spain created nominally independent 
infrastructure companies which are dependent upon the incumbent, publicly-owned 
railway company, a situation unlikely to be conducive to new entry.  In other cases, 
the structure of the reformed industry was poorly thought out, as Nash (2006) 
suggests was the case in the UK, or did not have much political support (Glaister, 
2006, also in reference to the UK).  However, poor implementation seems to be only 
part of the story.  The other part would appear to be lack of opportunities in the 
respective above-rail markets.  This is more troubling, for it means that solutions are 
unlikely to be found simply by improving the access system. 
North America 
Before examining the different perspectives of railways as economic entities in order 
to seek reasons why the historical records of Australia and Europe have been so poor 
in promoting above-rail competition, it is worthwhile examining briefly the 
experience of North America.  There is relatively little mandatory third party access in 
North America.  In Mexico, the privatised railway concessions were devised to 
promote origin-destination competition (by ensuring different companies connected 
major ports and cities), and mandatory access is required only over some assets in 
Mexico City and a few other centres, which several of the concessionaires share.  In 
Canada, inter-switching rights, first devised in the 1900s to prevent duplication of 
infrastructure in urban areas, are used by shippers with access to only one railway at 
their origin or destination to achieve some competitive pressure.  Shippers also have 
access to mandated running rights and (since 1987) competitive line rates.  Neither of 
these are used with any degree of frequency; the Canadian Transportation Act Review 
Panel (2001) reports fewer than a dozen cases of both.  The same review also argued 
against the extension of extant rights to a general access regime similar to Australia, 
due to concerns about the impacts this might have on the capital sustainability of the 
industry (ibid).  This recommendation was taken on board. 
 
Prior to 1980, the US had almost no requirement for mandatory access, because rates 
were set by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).  Since that time, the ability 
of the ICC and its successor (the Surface Transportation Board - STB) to set rates has 
been sharply curtailed.  However, the STB maintains the power to set conditions 
associated with rail mergers.  As successive merger waves amongst US railways after 
deregulation in 1980 has reduced the number of competing railways, the STB has 
included access provisions in some later merger approvals to ensure shippers do not 
become ‘captive’ to a single rail provider.  These access conditions are targeted to the 
needs of particular shippers (or locations), rather than being blanket requirements 
covering a whole network, as is the case in Australia and Europe. 
 
Additionally, US railways have long provided each other with trackage rights; the 
right (usually mutual) to traverse each other’s track, though not usually the right to 
stop and pick up or unload freight or passengers.  These trackage rights extend also 
into Canada and Mexico, as Class One railways operate in all three countries.  The 
Association of American Railroads (2006) estimates that roughly 20 percent of route 
miles was subject to voluntary or mandatory track access across the whole of North 
America (US, Canada and Mexico) in both 2005 and 2006.   Although this does not 
appear to be a large share, it is worth noting that this performance is better than any 
European country outside Sweden and the UK, and considerably better than Australia.  
A question of some importance, which is a subject of ongoing research, is whether 
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this larger share is due to the fact that most of the access provided is voluntary.  That 
is, whether it is the fact that access is regulated in Australia and Europe that is of 
issue.  The discussion below on economic regulation as a form of social choice, and 
of railways as a form of quasi-commons, suggests there might be some merit in this 
view.  However, equally, the much larger rail market in North America may provide 
more opportunities for railway operators, and the long history of cross-continental 
operations may have resulted in a marketplace less averse to sharing infrastructure 
than the historically closed operations of railways in Australia and Europe. 
Different Perspectives on Railways and the Limits of what 
Access Can Achieve 
The preceding discussion argues that neither of the two end-points are correct, a 
railway is neither (necessarily) wholly a marketplace or wholly a conveyor-belt.  In 
fact, it is not possible to address the issue from a principled perspective, but it is rather 
advisable to approach it from the characteristics of each railway concerned.  The 
historical record, which shows relatively limited success in introducing competition 
above rail amongst those jurisdictions which have introduced mandated third-party 
access, suggests that the application of access as a principle was inappropriate, and 
that there are limits to what one might expect an access regime to achieve.  The 
question is how one might perceive these limits.  This section explores the issue by 
examining railways from a number of different perspectives. 
Subadditivity 
In order for third party access to have any hope of success, there must be potential for 
sustainable above-rail competition.  If this potential does not exist, and the railway is 
not vertically separated, there will be no net change in the railway as a whole when 
third party access is applied, except perhaps some inefficiencies associated with 
requirements to ring fence operations.  This is because, even with perfect regulation 
of the below-rail component, the unregulated above rail component can simply 
capture the same rents as existed prior to reform and regulation.  If the railway is 
vertically separated into its above and below rail components, the pre-reform 
monopoly profits are in fact the best outcome one can expect.  If the regulator is 
unable to hold prices for below rail services down to competitive levels, the inability 
of the above-rail sector to support competition will result in double-marginalisation; 
higher prices and lower output than under vertically integrated monopoly. 
 
The potential for the above rail sector to support competition can be examined via 
subadditivity analysis; examining whether it is more or less costly for one firm or 
multiple firms to undertake the above rail task.  Costliness, in this context, is a 
function of the fixed costs of above-rail operation, such as locomotives.  A number of 
papers have examined subadditivity in the context of US railways (Bitzhan, 2000, 
2003 and Ivaldi & McCullough, 2002, 2006) and one has examined it in the context 
of Australian railways (Wills-Johnson, 2007a).  All of the papers find that the above-
rail task is indeed subadditive, in both the US and Australia, suggesting that attempts 
to introduce competition may be short-lived.  From this perspective, third-party access 
endeavours to perform an impossible task. 
 
However, two important caveats exist in relation to these findings.  Firstly, by 
necessity, each of the above papers takes the above-rail task of the incumbent 
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monopolists and splits it into a two-firm task (usually in several thousand different 
combinations).  Thus, the underlying cost structure is that of the incumbent.  A new 
entrant might have a cost structure sufficiently different from the incumbent that it 
could survive, particularly as part of a competitive fringe.  Secondly, although there 
may be room for only one above-rail player, that player need not be the incumbent, 
and indeed competition for the market (particularly as large minerals haulage 
contracts are renewed) may be a suitable proxy for competition in the market, in terms 
of its ability to promote efficiency in the industry. 
 
Whilst the studies mentioned above cover only Australia and the US, and focussed on 
whole systems, rather than individual routes where high traffic might support 
competition which a network would not, it seems that above rail competition as a 
presumption underlying reform is inappropriate.  Instead, policymakers should rather 
focus, as the Productivity Commission (2007) suggested recently, on individual, 
highly trafficked routes, which might support competition in point-to-point services.   
The Effects of Oligopoly Above Rail 
The discussion above focuses on whether competition might emerge above-rail.  This 
section examines whether the mere presence of competitors is likely to result in prices 
and outputs which are close to the levels one would expect under perfect competition.  
Since regulation controls below-rail prices and outputs, the focus is on the above-rail 
sector.  Since the empirical evidence on the emergence of competition thus far 
suggests that the number of competitors which arise will be small, it suggests one 
should focus on competition amongst members of small groups.  This suggests the 
framework of oligopoly analysis may be more fruitful than perfect competition.   
 
Oligopoly is a vast body of literature, impossible to effectively summarise here.5  
Moreover, there is considerable conflict in the literature; it does not represent the 
same cohesive body of theory as perfect competition and perfect monopoly.  
However, to give some flavour of the effects of considering the above-rail sector in an 
oligopolistic sense, consider Cournot, or quantity-based competition, which is 
commonly used to model oligopolistic competition. 
 
If the above-rail firms engage in Cournot competition with the same cost functions 
and the below-rail firm is regulated effectively to produce competitive output and 





−    
 
where p refers to price, c to marginal cost, n to the number of firms and ε to the 
elasticity of demand for rail freight.  The above formula essentially shows the mark-
up over marginal cost for each firm one might expect in such a situation.  As n 
increases, this approaches marginal cost pricing.6  A key element is the elasticity of 
demand for rail services.  Meyrick and Associates (2006) in a recent paper for the 
Victorian Essential Services Commission, survey the Australian literature and suggest 
                                                 
5 Schmalensee & Willig (1989) provide a comprehensive overview of the literature, in two volumes. 
6 This is not quite correct, and depends upon all firms having non-negative output.  See Novshek 
(1980) for details. 
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a ‘consensus range’ of own-price elasticity for rail of between 0.4 and 0.9.7  For a 
given track at the bottom of this range, in order to achieve mark-ups of 50 percent 
above competitive levels, one would require five above rail firms, and  if one was to 
achieve mark-ups for rail freight services that are within ten percent of competitive 
levels, one would need 25 competitors.  At the upper end of this range, the figures are 
2.2 and 11.1 respectively.  By comparison, the best Australia has produced so far is 
six above-rail freight operators competing on the East-West link,8 which is likely to 
have elasticity of demand towards the lower end of the above range, because its long 
distances mean rail is more competitive against road.  Thus it is far from clear 
whether the amount of competitors which, realistically, are likely to arise will 
generate competition of a sufficient amount and type to move prices and outputs a 
significant distance towards competitive levels on most Australian railways. 
 
The above analysis is, of course, very crude.  In the first instance, it is not clear 
whether above-rail firms engage in Cournot competition at all, and a different 
conjectural variations framework may give different results (notably Bertrand 
competition, which Whinston, 2006, suggests drives long-term rail haulage contracts 
in the US).  Secondly, the assumption that all above-rail firms have the same costs is 
also unlikely to be true.  However, this makes the situation worse than outlined above, 
because then the result turns on market share, and the market share of newcomers is 
often very small.  Further work in this respect is clearly needed, most particularly in 
understanding the way in which above-rail firms might strategically interact.  At 
present, all that can be said is that, even where above rail competition emerges, the 
effect might not necessarily be to replicate or even approach the outcomes of perfect 
competition.  Actual gains may be more modest, and this should be reflected in an 
assessment of the appropriateness of a given access regime. 
Transactions Cost Economics  
The previous two viewpoints focussed on the likelihood of above-rail competition and 
the impact smaller numbers of competitors might have on the level of prices and 
output.  This section focuses on the interaction between above and below rail, and on 
the degree to which a railway is a ‘conveyor-belt’.  It does so by considering railways 
from the perspective of transactions cost economics. 
 
Coase (1937) suggested that markets were not the only place in which transactions 
were made and resource allocations decided, pointing out that many economic 
transactions occur inside firms.  For example, firms will often make, rather than buy, 
intermediate components and train, rather than hire, their employees.  Each 
transaction, he suggested was accompanied by a cost were it to occur in a market 
setting, and a different cost if it were to occur in a managerial setting within a firm.  
Managers of firms, he suggested, would internalise those transactions which were less 
expensive when handled through a managerial structure and go to the market when it 
provided lower transactions costs.  For example, a standard widget with an easily 
assessed level of quality might be cheaper to purchase in a marketplace, particularly if 
only small amounts of it were needed and its manufacture incurred high costs.  By 
                                                 
7 Rail-road cross elasticity figures are higher, with a one percent decrease in road freight price resulting 
in a 2.2 percent decrease in rail freight.  This reflects the fact that, amongst the items which are also 
carried by road over distances less than 1500km, rail is very sensitive to price. 
8 According to ARTC’s website (www.artc.com.au ), a total of nine railways utilise its network.  Seven 
of these operate on the East-West link and six of these carry freight. 
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contrast, a talented, responsible manager whose loyalty and performance could make 
or break a company might better be trained up from entry-level within the firm, so 
that the firm’s owners could be confident she would not betray their interests.  The 
literature seeking to determine whether transactions are more likely to occur in the 
market or within a firm is known as Transactions Cost Economics (TCE). 
 
The very brief description above suggests that, whilst in principle it might be simple 
to imagine the borders of a firm as being that point where the market cost of a 
transaction equals the cost of the same transaction inside the firm, in practice, there 
might be a great deal of heterogeneity.9  Indeed, the large differences between firms, 
even in a single industry suggests this is the case empirically.  This can frustrate 
analysis.  However, Williamson (1979) has provided some more detail within which 
to frame a TCE assessment.  He suggests three key dimensions of a transaction: 
• Uncertainty: transactions whereby the buyer finds it very difficult to assess 
quality ex-ante might be more likely to occur within a firm. 
• Frequency: transactions which occur frequently might motivate the firm to incur 
the fixed costs required to produce the good or service internally. 
• Asset Specificity: transactions for goods or services which have little value 
outside the firm might be less expensive if sourced internally. 
 
In railways, there are two key transactions, from the perspective of third party access.  
The first of these is the longer term transaction whereby above rail firms contract with 
those below-rail in order to obtain access and train paths.  The second is the shorter 
term transaction which occurs on the day, whereby the above-rail firm transacts with a 
train manager for the actual movement of the train itself.  The two are separate 
transactions because, even within the constraints of a given train path, there is a 
requirement to manage the movement of a train on the day it runs, due to the complex 
nature of a rail network and the over-riding need to ensure trains do not collide. 
 
The main focus here is on the longer-term transaction, whereby a train operator 
purchases (or otherwise obtains) access and a train path from the below-rail operator.  
Is this transaction likely to be less expensive to conduct in-house or in the market?  
One the basis of Williamson’s (1979) three criteria above, the judgement is difficult to 
make on a principled basis.  On the one hand, engineering reports and other 
documents make it relatively simple to judge the quality of the track to which access 
is being bought, but on the other hand, the transactions are frequent; a railway 
operator might sign a contract involving several train paths a week over many years.  
Asset specificity is something of a product of the access regime itself; there is only 
one purpose to which a railway track can be put, running trains, but if there is more 
than one access seeker and a secondary market exists, it is likely to be relatively 
simple to on-sell unused capacity.10  If there is no secondary market, or the market is 
thin, on-selling capacity may prove very difficult. 
 
Australian policy towards third party access in railways reflects this mixed 
assessment.  The decision to mandate third party access with no vertical separation is, 
                                                 
9 Indeed, the presence of joint ventures and other similar arrangements suggest that the line between 
firm and market is quite blurred. 
10 Although not instantaneously; if a train at Cooke on The East-West link breaks down and can go no 
further, there is unlikely to be anyone to whom the train operator can sell the now unnecessary 
remainder of that train path. 
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from the perspective of (TCE), a declaration that the access transaction can be as 
effectively governed by the market as by mechanisms internal to the firm.  The 
decision to vertically separate a railway into its above and below-rail components is a 
declaration that the market is a more efficient way of organising this transaction than 
the managerial mechanisms internal to a firm.  In Australia, the fact that third party 
access with and without vertical separation is being trialled in different states with 
similar freight tasks is difficult to reconcile from a TCE perspective, but suggests 
perhaps that the natural extent of a railway might not be a finely defined line, but 
rather, a band.  The experience of Europe, where some countries have vertically 
separated but some have not, suggests that policymakers share the same view. 
 
The issue should be capable of resolution in an empirical examination.  Since all 
railways which are now vertically separated were once vertically integrated, if the 
transaction is less costly in the marketplace than internal to the firm, one should 
expect to see a decrease in cost or an increase in efficiency with separation.  If costs 
and efficiency do not change, then the transaction is equally efficient in the firm and 
in the market, which suggests, absent of other costs, that it does not matter whether 
third party access is accompanied by vertical separation or not.  If costs increase and 
efficiency decreases, then the transaction is better handled within the firm, and thus 
that both vertical separation and third party access are unwise policies. 
 
However, the evidence is mixed.  Wills-Johnson (2007a) finds little evidence that 
vertical separation in Australia should have caused efficiency losses and reports the 
results of a survey of industry participants which suggests few major impacts on 
investment due to separation in Australia.  Ivaldi & McCullough (2006) examining 
US data, suggest that vertical separation could cause efficiency losses of between 20 
and 40 percent.  Preston (1996), examining European railways, suggests that optimal 
economies of scale occur for mid-sized European railways, and hence that larger 
railways might be broken-up without efficiency losses, although he does not 
specifically examine vertical separation.  Cantos, Pastor & Serrano (1999), examining 
European rail productivity, suggest that most of the productivity gains in recent times 
occurred between 1985 and 1995, before separation and access became prevalent.  
Moreover, the authors suggest that productivity gains were cause by technological 
change.  Freibel, Ivaldi & Vibes (2003), examining separation, independent regulation 
and the introduction of competition, find that sequencing of these reforms produces 
efficiency gains, but that introducing the reforms as a package does not.  This 
suggests the capacity of the industry to absorb reform might be limited.  Finally, 
Cantos (2001) examines interactions between infrastructure costs and freight and 
passenger transport output.  For freight output, he finds increasing infrastructure costs 
decreases marginal costs, suggesting perhaps efficiency losses from separation.  
 
Clearly, more work is required before one can make a definitive statement concerning 
the efficiency effects of vertical separation.  At present, it would seem most wise to 
conclude that the mix of findings suggests that each railway is different, and that 
some are well and others ill-suited (from a TCE perspective) to the introduction of 
third party access or to vertical separation.  Policymakers should thus proceed along 
the same lines; railway by railway rather than according to some general principle. 
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Regulation as a Form of Social Choice – Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem 
Third party access is presented as a decision-making process based in economics.  
However, economic decisions do not exist in isolation; arguably, the process of 
economic regulation is merely one type of social choice mechanism.  That is, it is 
merely one way to go from the preferences of each party in the process (the regulated 
utility, its customers and the regulator) to a form of ‘social preference’ which 
represents the regulatory outcome of a price or revenue cap.  This is especially the 
case because economic regulation requires the use of models and forecasts.  A 
regulator commonly develops a model of a ‘best practice’ version of the railway being 
regulated, and then forecasts cost and demand conditions over the regulatory horizon 
in order to arrive at the appropriate price or revenue cap.  Each forecast is based upon 
a set of assumptions, and each set of assumptions is based (explicitly or implicitly) on 
the preferences of those making the assumptions.  The assumptions are often different 
amongst the different parties in the regulatory process, due to their different 
preferences, and this gives rise to different forecasts. 
 
Examining economic regulation from the perspective that it is a form of social choice 
allows some rather useful insights into the process itself, by considering some general 
results associated with social choice mechanisms.  Arguably, the most important 
result in the social choice literature is Arrow’s (1950) Impossibility Theorem.  The 
argument is developed more fully in a companion paper (Wills-Johnson, 2007b) and 
sketched below.  Firstly, consider an assumption underlying a forecast to consist of 
two types of information: 
• Objective information: which can be objectively assessed by, quantified by and 
compared between all players in the regulatory game. 
• Subjective information: which is either private to a player or, if public, cannot be 
meaningfully compared between players or objectively assessed by them. 
 
Profit streams are an example of the former, whilst the differing views between the 
NCC and BHP (see NCC, 2005) concerning the impacts of third parties on BHP’s 
existing operations in the Pilbara are an example of the latter. 
 
Secondly, note that each player has a preference schedule, comprised of numerous 
outcomes.  For example, a railway owner might prefer forecasts based on his own 
assumptions over those of the regulator, and those of the regulator’s assumptions over 
those in submissions by its customers.  There may also be many more outcomes, 
based on sensitivity analysis of certain assumptions or some other mechanism.  The 
important point is that each outcome is discreet, and that each party is capable of 
ordering the outcomes into a preference schedule.  The means by which they do so is 
not relevant.  It is also useful to assume, as Arrow does, universality and monotonicity 
of preference ordering and that irrelevant alternatives are independent of the choice 
process in respect to preference formation (see Arrow, 1963). 
 
Finally, note that, in forming an ordering of outcomes, each player makes use of both 
subjective and objective information.  It is proposed (see Wills-Johnson, 2007b) that, 
if only objective information determines the ordering, then it is possible to map from 
the set of individual preference schedules to a social preference, but that if a piece of 
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subjective information is decisive (that is, it determines an ordering), Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem holds.11  This means that a regulatory outcome is either: 
• a social preference which is unrelated to any individual preference schedule, or 
any combination of them; or 
• a social preference which reflects the individual preferences of only one player; 
the Arrovian dictator. 
 
Both of these outcomes have unpalatable consequences for economic regulation.  If 
the social preference (ie – the outcome of the regulatory process) is unrelated to 
individual preferences, this means that the requirement that the regulator consider the 
legitimate business interests of the infrastructure owners is a logical impossibility; the 
infrastructure is inevitably socialised, regardless of who owns it.  It also means that 
the process of consultation is largely a waste of time for stakeholders; although it 
might glean some information, the final outcome can never reflect any of the desires 
of stakeholders, nor any combination of those desires. 
 
If the social preference always reflects the preferences of a single individual, and all 
parties are equally balanced, then perhaps one might have an outcome which favours 
one party at one stage and another at a different stage.  However, all parties are not 
equally balanced; the regulator has the unique power of being able to enforce an 
outcome.  It thus seems likely that the regulator will, over time, make more and more 
of the decisions of the industry, becoming an Arrovian ‘dictator’.  Indeed, the history 
of long-lived regulatory bodies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
in the US (see Hoogenbaum & Hoogenbaum, 1976) and the 19th Century Railway 
Commissioners Court in the UK (McWilliams, 1923) show precisely this increasing 
role in the decision-making process.  It seems, therefore, that the notion of light-
handed regulation is something of a myth.   
 
Regardless of which outcome (above) a given regulatory system obtains, it is 
unsurprising that owners of railways and other stakeholders in them (see, for example, 
the discussion of union opposition to access regimes in France in Quinet, 2006) have 
resisted access; the change in governance effectively removes their ability to control 
the asset.  It may also explain why so few have been willing to play the access game 
as above-rail entrants; why partake of a game which one seems destined to lose? 
 
Considering economic regulation from the perspective of social choice theory thus 
provides a useful means of questioning the fundamental basis of regulation itself.  For 
example, economic regulation of corporatised or privatised entities is often held up as 
a means of improving resource allocation and efficiency in industries which were 
formerly managed as public-sector organisations.  However, if the industry concerned 
is characterised by a great deal of subjective information, it is difficult to see how 
economic regulation is any different or more effective than any other social choice 
mechanism.  It also allows one to isolate cases where economic regulation might be a 
more effective process, namely those industries where preference is characterised by 
objective information.  Finally, as the companion paper (Wills-Johnson, 2007b) 
argues, this perspective of economic regulation allows one to develop predictive 
models of regulatory evolution.  
                                                 
11 Proof of this proposition is a work in progress. 
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The Tragedy of the Commons 
Third party access changes the economic characteristics of a railway in two important 
ways.  Firstly, it dilutes the property rights of the track-owner, transferring some of 
these rights to access seekers, who commonly sign relatively long-term contracts with 
infrastructure owners.  These contracts give them some rights of input into decisions 
pertaining to the operation, maintenance and investment profiles of the railway which 
exceed those enjoyed by customers of a firm.  Secondly, access potentially provides a 
misalignment between the private benefits and social costs of a decision made by 
above or below-rail firms.  For example, wheel grinding might cost an above-rail firm 
$2 million per annum, but bring only $1 million per annum in cost savings to it.  
There is thus no incentive to grind wheels.  However, unground wheels on trains 
operated by this firm might cause $10 million in damages to the railway track.  
Glaister (2006) provides an example of precisely this scenario in the UK.  One has, in 
essence, an example of Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons”;  a common (or 
quasi-common, as a railway track has owners) resource is overused because the 
benefits from over-use are privatised whilst the costs are socialised. 
 
In theory, at least, charging and penalty regimes within an access arrangement should 
be able to align public and private incentives again.  However, as discussed 
previously in the context of UK penalty regimes, these schemes can be difficult to put 
into practice.  It is therefore useful to step outside the framework of neoclassical 
economics, and into the field of co-operative game theory, where a substantial 
literature examines potential solutions to tragedy of the commons type situations.  
Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1992) provide comprehensive accounts of mechanisms 
used to govern commons resources, whilst Friedman (1977) and Myerson (1991) 
provide textbook introductions to the study of co-operative games.  To give a flavour 
of these models, consider the approach of Sethi & Somanathan (1996). 
 
In this model, there are three classes of player producing using a common resource; 
defectors who overuse the resource, enforcers who punish defectors using 
punishments which are costly to themselves and co-operators who do not impose 
sanctions.  Through the use of an evolutionary game,12 they show two classes of 
stable equilibria are possible.  The first of these occurs where all players are defectors, 
an outcome which is locally stable for all parameter values.  This results in 
unsustainable use of the commons resource; Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons.  
The second is a series of less stable and rarer local equilibria consisting just of 
enforcers and co-operators.  Each is based around social norms associated with a 
punishment function.  Sustainability thus turns on developing the right social norms. 
 
The development of suitable social norms is an issue in itself, and requires a quite 
different paradigm from that which pervades economic regulation.  Moreover, the 
organic growth of such norms and their potential diversity may be troublesome to 
policymakers more accustomed to a more deterministic, centrally-planned approach.  
There may also be issues in ensuring that social norms do not simply split economic 
rents, although presumably this can be addressed by policymakers becoming part of 
the process of developing them.  The fact that a process is unfamiliar, difficult and 
uncertain in its outcomes does not, however, mean it should be dismissed out of hand.  
In its favour, the development of social norms is demonstrably better at sustaining a 
                                                 
12 A static model always predicts over-exploitation 
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common resource than economic regulation.  The longest-lived regulator of a utility is 
the ICC in the US, which managed less than 100 years of governance of that nation’s 
railways.  By the 1970s, the model had become so unconducive to the long-term 
survival of US railways that it was largely abandoned.  By contrast, even pre-literate 
societies have been able to develop sets of social norms governing the use of 
commons resources which sustain the resource for centuries.  There would thus seem 
to be at least some lessons policymakers could draw from the approach. 
 
It would seem, moreover, that the lessons are being learned in the Australian railway 
sector.  The Hunter Valley Coal Chain Logistics Team is an example of an attempt to 
establish a set of ‘social norms’ to cover the use of a logistics chain in Australia.13  
However, it exists only through an exemption to the Trade Practices Act which is 
renewed following assessment by the ACCC on a regular basis.  This caution is 
understandable, as a set of ‘social norms’ which result only in a way of sharing 
monopoly rents is not particularly helpful.  However, the perspective of railways as a 
quasi-commons resource does suggest approaches designed around social norms 
might be able to bring sustainability to the industry in the 21st Century which 
economic regulation could not in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 
Can We Improve Rail Policy? Lessons from the Different 
Perspectives 
The preceding discussion suggests a number of useful lessons for policymakers.  
Examining the issue of railway access from the perspective of subadditivity suggests 
that one should expect, at best, rather limited scope for competition to emerge above-
rail.  Examining it from the perspective of oligopoly theory suggests that such 
competition as does emerge above rail, need not necessarily reduce prices and 
increase output to competitive levels.  The extent to which it does so depends very 
much on the nature of interaction between above-rail firms.  The perspective of TCE 
highlights the need to consider each railway in turn, and not simply to try and apply 
broad principles from elsewhere.  This is because the degree and type of integration 
between various elements of a railway and the nature of cost-minimisation is not 
necessarily homogenous.  The practical upshot of these lessons for policymakers is 
that they should not consider third party access in rail as a blanket solution to be 
applied across the industry, but rather as a targeted solution, tailored to certain 
situations.  In previous work (Wills-Johnson 2007a), the author has suggested that the 
East-West mainline is perhaps the only place in Australia that third-party access is 
likely to really have the effects which policymakers hope for.  The Productivity 
Commission (2007) has advocated a similar targeted approach, though without the 
same sectoral specificity. 
 
Examining the issue of access from the perspective of economic regulation as a 
special case of social choice theory allows one to consider the very fundamentals of 
how economic regulation operates when it relies upon subjective information to form 
forecasts.  The implications of the analysis are troubling, and perhaps it is 
unsurprising that few have entered an industry where regulation implies that their 
preferences will seldom, if ever, be met. 
                                                 
13 Shires, Preston, Nash & Wardman (1994) suggest that Amtrack and US freight railways similarly 
went through a process first of endeavouring to tie each other down via contracts over access and later 
to working cooperatively on investment and operational expenditure. 
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Examining the issue from the perspective of a railway track as a quasi-commons 
allows policymakers to consider the merits of alternate governance mechanisms.  
These might not have the appearance of clarity and simplicity that current methods 
possess, but the beauty of current regulatory methods may only be skin-deep, 
particularly if one considers the sustainability of the infrastructure being regulated.  
Whilst economic regulation has succeeded in sustaining industries for at best a few 
dozen years before systems have become unworkable, social norms developed b y 
even the most primitive of societies, have managed to sustain common resources for 
centuries.  As the managers of the Hunter Valley Coal Chain Logistics Team appear 
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